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Knowledge sharing is a determinant for online platforms to run their business. Several 
strategies have been proposed to increase knowledge sharing, among which monetary 
incentive is commonly used. While previous studies have found a crowding-out effect of 
monetary incentive on contribution quality, the research on alleviating this crowding out 
effect is limited. Drawing upon the autonomy in self-determination theory and the feeling 
of reciprocity, this study examines the impacts of payment timing of monetary incentives 
and contents in reminder messages sent by e-commerce platforms on contribution 
quality. This study intends to provide theoretical and practical implications about 
motivations on knowledge sharing. 




With the characteristics of public goods, online reviews are a form of knowledge sharing and largely depend 
on customers’ volunteer contributions. Scholars propose several mechanisms to encourage quality 
contributions, such as social effects (Zhang and Zhu 2011). In particular, monetary incentives have been 
widely employed by plenty of online communities and platforms such as YouTube and Wikipedia. A positive 
influence on review contribution by offering customers monetary incentives is highlighted that financial 
incentives can motivate feedback quantity on eBay (Cabral and Li 2015). However, there are also arguments 
suggesting that the existence of crowding-out effect of monetary incentives, which indicates that with the 
usage of monetary incentives, individuals’ intrinsic motivations toward review contribution may be 
undermined, then causes reduced contribution (Khern-am-nuai et al. 2017), less information (Burtch et al. 
2017), non-objective opinions (Cabral and Li 2015) in online reviews. Given the significance of e-WoM in 
supporting consumer decision making, there is a pressing need for both the practitioners and the academia 
to gaining insights into the mechanisms underlying the influence of monetary incentives on consumer 
knowledge contribution.  
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We examine the impacts of payment timing of monetary incentives and contents in reminder messages sent 
by e-commerce platforms on the quality of consumer knowledge contribution. Specifically, monetary 
incentives have some crowding-out effects on reviewer contribution behavior (Dubé et al. 2017; Khern-am-
nuai et al. 2017), encouraging recent studies to focus on solutions such as social norms (Burtch et al. 2017). 
However, research about how to alleviate the crowding-out effects on the generation of online reviews is 
still not fully developed due to the lack of understanding about underlying mechanisms. Therefore, this 
study introduces pre-paid monetary incentives relative to traditional promised incentives to identify the 
underlying mechanisms, which can be helpful to propose strategies overcoming negative influences of 
monetary incentives. With the provision of pre-paid monetary incentives, individuals may feel free to write 
reviews without worrying how to get the payment since they already received the payment, thus the sense 
of freedom (autonomy) may increase. In addition, by receiving the payment in advance, individuals may 
perceive that the platforms/firms trust them and treat them nicely, which can enhance their sense of 
reciprocity. Thus, we propose autonomy and reciprocity may work as underlying mechanisms behind the 
influence of payment time of money. 
Reminder messages are also employed by platforms to motivate user knowledge contributions. For 
example, platforms, i.e., Ctrip.com have started to email their customers who have actual booking records 
to motivate more online reviews (Gu and Ye 2014). While reminder messages are widely applied and found 
to positively influence review contribution, little research has examined the effect of different reminder 
content on consumers’ review contributions. This study sends reminders with different contents after the 
paying of money to explore the influence on knowledge contribution and further investigate the underlying 
mechanisms of monetary incentives. 
Literature Review and Theoretical Foundation 
Motivational Incentive & Knowledge Sharing 
Extrinsic motivations such as monetary rewards have uncertain effects on knowledge sharing. On one hand, 
individuals tend to share knowledge and experience when perceiving money as a fair exchange (Cabral and 
Li 2015). However, rewards may undermine intrinsic motivation and reduce contribution quantity (Gutt et 
al. 2017). That is, the quality of knowledge contribution may deteriorate when using monetary incentives 
because of the crowding-out effect. For example, Burtch et al. (2017) conducted two experiments and found 
that reviews resulted by monetary incentives are shorter than those without incentives on average.  
Payment Timing of Monetary Incentive 
The payment timing of monetary incentive has been investigated in the literature focusing on online survey 
gathering and response rate. There are two main strategies based on the timing of incentives. The first is 
promised incentives, referring to rewards received after returning the completed questionnaire and the 
other is prepaid incentives that is, rewards delivered before the completion of questionnaire (Bosnjak and 
Tuten 2003). The relationship between pre-paid monetary incentives and response rates have been 
examined that increasing values of pre-paid money can enhance response rate in a survey (Jobber et al. 
2004). Further studies showed that prepaid incentives yield higher response rates than promised incentives 
do (Singer and Ye 2012). Response quality is also an important issue (James and Bolstein 1990). However, 
there is limited research considering response quality when using monetary incentive and the existing 
studies found no significant differences between survey data quality with and without incentives (Davern 
et al. 2003).  
Reminder Message in Survey 
The role of reminders such as sending postcard, letters, SMS and e-mail has been examined in the research 
on online survey responses (Porter 2004). E-mail messages have become one of the most commonly used 
methods to remind participations and can increase response rate dramatically (Porter 2004; Putnam-Farr 
2015). Reminder design has also been found to affect companies’ interaction with participants. For 
example, Putnam-Farr (2015)showed that messages with forced choice settings such as yes and no choices 
can yield higher click-through rates compared to messages with traditional opt-in formats, i.e., click here 
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to enroll. The previous studies focused on response rates with and without reminders, little considers the 
reminder contents and the influence on response quality.  
Self-determination Theory & Autonomy 
Self-determination theory argues three innate needs as the basis for self-motivation, namely competence, 
relatedness and autonomy (Ryan and Deci 2000). Competence can be fulfilled by given unexpected positive 
feedback on a task (Deci 1971) and relatedness can be enhanced when feeling closer to others (Ryan et al. 
2010). Both two needs can be satisfied by some internal or external contingencies and fulfilling these two 
needs can obtain strong controlled orientations. Differently, autonomy, referring to the extent to which 
acting and experiencing choice with a sense of freedom and the desire to be causal agents of own life, is 
relatively independent of others (Deci and Ryan 1985). We adopted SDT to explore the internal motivation 
in our context, thus we focused on autonomy as our first mechanism. 
When individuals engage in some activities because of perceived enjoyment and self-efficacy fulfillment, 
their actions to continue are totally free-driven, namely autonomous motivations. When involving actions 
because of external pressure, their sense of controlled motivations may be activated (Deci 1971). Using pre-
paid incentives suggests that individuals will receive rewards before filling in the questionnaires, giving 
them enough freedom and trust to choose whether and how to finish the survey tasks (Bosnjak and Tuten 
2003). In this way, autonomous motivations will be activated, inducing higher intrinsic motivations and 
larger response rates (Singer and Ye 2012). On the occasions of promised incentives, individuals may 
perceive lower trust and autonomy. This external constrain may cause the appearance of controlled 
motivations, explaining the relatively lower response rates.  
Autonomy is also an important factor when considering the participation of knowledge sharing. A number 
of studies have empirically verified its influence (Foss et al. 2009; Roberts et al. 2006). For example, Foss 
et al. (2009)found that in workplace, job characteristics such as autonomy will predict different motivations 
and actual knowledge sharing behaviors and (Roberts et al. 2006) suggested that a restrained autonomy 
caused by monetary incentives tend to undermine intrinsic motivations and reduce average contribution 
level on Open Source Software Developers. 
Reciprocity 
The second mechanism is the feeling of reciprocity. As an interpersonal construct, reciprocity was defined 
as a norm driven by a feeling of indebtedness in which individuals expect good returns for good giving 
(Gouldner 1960). Following prior studies in survey context, it’s reasonable to argue that the rewards in 
advance (pre-paid monetary incentives) suggesting the favor given to recipients, are helpful to increase their 
willingness to complete the survey. This argument have been supported by several prior studies that the use 
of pre-payment is more effective inducing survey participations (Singer and Ye 2012). While promised 
monetary incentive is treated as pure compensation rather favor, making the survey completion as an 
explicit exchange, hence decreasing its efficiency and outcome (Porter 2004).  
In the context of knowledge sharing, reciprocity is a behavioral response to perceived kindness or fairness, 
namely, a fair mutual exchange behavior (Chiu et al. 2006). Prior researchers have identified reciprocity as 
one of the most important factors motivating knowledge sharing because individuals who share with others 
believe they will be paid back (Wasko and Faraj 2005). Chen and Hung (2010) empirically showed that 
norm of reciprocity can significantly enhance quantity of knowledge sharing in virtual communities. Thus, 
it’s important to consider what induces reciprocity. Exhibited trusts and feelings of obligation are both 
found to affect the reciprocity of individuals (Kanagaretnam et al. 2009). In electronic markets, websites 
can generate more knowledge by making customers feel being kindly treated. 
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Research Model & Key Hypotheses 
 
Figure 1. The Research Model 
 
The research model is presented in Figure 1. 
Payment Timing of Monetary Incentive 
We first hypothesize that payment timing of monetary incentives will have an impact on the quality of 
consumer knowledge contribution such that pre-paid incentives will induce knowledge sharing with higher 
quality. Unlike a promised monetary incentive, a pre-paid one can promote reciprocity feelings in potential 
contributors by showing the good will first. It can also exhibit senders’ trusts toward receivers, through 
which the sense of reciprocity will be further enhanced (Kanagaretnam et al. 2009). Under reciprocity 
feelings, people are more likely to help others as the same way they have been helped (Gouldner 1960). 
Thus if a platform offers the pre-paid incentive, individuals tend to repay it back by offering high-quality 
reviews to help the platform operate its business.  
In addition, a pre-paid monetary incentive gives reviewers the feelings of autonomy when providing their 
e-WoM. That is, the contributor is less likely to be concerned about if what he/she writes in the review will 
affect the money they will receive. Thus he/she has the freedom to provide his/her true feelings/opinions. 
Self-determination theory (SDT) suggests that this autonomy is more likely to increase intrinsic motivation 
and lead to better knowledge contribution (Deci and Ryan 1985). The underlying mechanism is that the 
sense of autonomy induced by pre-paid incentive allows individuals make decisions according to their own 
interest and needs, better fulfilling their intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, supporting autonomy is 
positively associated with trust, which is an essential factor in cooperative behaviors, i.e., online knowledge 
sharing (Lui and Ngo 2004). In short, a pre-paid monetary incentive motivates reviewers to contribute 
more objective and diversified opinions via creating the sense of autonomy and reciprocity. Thus, we 
hypothesize that,  
H1: A pre-paid monetary incentive induces better quality of knowledge contribution than a promised 
monetary incentive does. 
Content in Reminder Message 
We further assume that the type of reminder contents will moderate the impacts of payment timing of 
monetary incentives on knowledge contribution quality. E-WoM platforms send several kinds of notices—
such as login messages, SMS, and emails—to potential reviewers to encourage them to publish reviews. 
Typically, the reminder content is about the deadline of providing reviews—e.g., Taobao.com sometimes 
sends reminder messages to alert customers about the remaining review time since it has the policy that 
consumers can only provide reviews in 15 days after the product delivery.  
Other contents can also be included in the reminder messages to help E-WoM platforms promote reviews 
with better quality. We conjecture that different reminder contents can enhance/attenuate the impact of 
payment timing from two directions. On one hand, if reminder messages activate or reinforce intrinsic 
motivations, consumers have a great chance of contributing reviews of better quality than those related to 
extrinsic motivations. Existing research has found that cues that reinforcing social norms—i.e., 
Reminder Message 
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activating/reinforcing the intrinsic motivation of relatedness in SDT—improves consumers’ contribution 
effort, thus generating longer reviews (Burtch et al. 2018). In the current study, we focus on two types of 
contents in the reminder messages—1) emphasizing the importance of reviews to the platform (e.g., “Your 
review is very important to us, and we'd love to hear about it!”) and 2) emphasizing the deadline of the 
review. These two types of reminder message contents can respectively influence reciprocity and autonomy, 
both of which are mechanisms we intend to test. By doing so, we may better identity the mechanisms and 
find practical operations.  
Referring to the first type of contents (emphasizing the importance of reviews to a platform), we argue that 
this kind of reminder message can be helpful to urge a customer to act and help the platform if the platform 
has done something good to the customer (i.e., offering pre-paid monetary incentives). This argument can 
be explained from two perspectives. First, based on equity theory, individuals behave by balancing the 
relationship between costs and benefits (Oliver and Swan 1989). Costs refer to the amount of effort or time 
that individuals pay to write reviews and benefits represent the good thing that writing reviews can bring 
about to the platform since reciprocity feelings to the platform are triggered by pre-paid monetary 
incentives. Since costs to write reviews are constant in our context, higher benefits can motivate individuals 
to put more effort and generate high-quality reviews. By highlighting the importance of reviews to the 
platform, individuals will perceive their reviews as more valuable and worth their effort, thus, their sense 
of reciprocity will be reinforced. Second, prior studies identified several factors that can affect the sense of 
reciprocity (Gouldner 1960; Kanagaretnam et al. 2009). Among these factors, the value of the benefit to the 
recipient is an important one (Gouldner 1960). Extending to our context, emphasizing the importance of 
reviews increases the value of the benefit of reviews to the recipient, thus, enhancing the feeling of 
reciprocity. Combined together, we thus hypothesize that,  
H2: A reminder emphasizing review importance to the platform will strengthen the positive effect of pre-
paid monetary incentive on the quality of knowledge contribution. 
On the other hand, a reminder emphasizing the deadline of providing reviews will push a consumer to write 
a timely review via the feeling of time constraint. For example, time pressure, namely external deadline can 
increase individual efficiency in workplace (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002). Shorter time window has been 
found to induce higher virtues (Siddiqui et al. 2016). By sending reminder messages, customers will be 
alerted of the time limitation and increase contribution quantity. 
However, reminder messages including deadline information may negatively affect the review quality. 
When a person’s choice is constrained by external forces, i.e., an approaching deadline, his/her intrinsic 
motivation such as the sense of autonomy will diminish (Amabile et al. 1976). For instance, (Amabile et al. 
1976) found that adding deadline policy into an interesting activity indeed decreases subjects' intrinsic 
motivation. Later study further proves the statement that as deadline comes closer, individuals’ preference 
for costs and benefits changes that they tend to focus on costs and ignore benefits (Akerlof 1991). With 
higher costs and lower benefits, individuals will underestimate their behavior and are less likely to take 
actions in the future (Oliver and Swan 1989). In the current study, the cost is the time that customers need 
to devote to writing reviews. When deadline information is emphasized, the time left for providing reviews 
changes customers’ mind about the preference for costs (time) and benefits that customers care more about 
costs and pay less attention on benefits. In this way, customers are less likely to devote much time and effort 
on writing reviews. Therefore,  
H3: A reminder emphasizing the deadline information will attenuate the positive effect of pre-paid 
monetary incentive on the quality of knowledge contribution. 
Research Design 
Two lab experiments will be conducted to test the hypothesis. Students will be recruited to participate in 
the lab experiments and will be offered an experience good —WIX.com, which is a cloud-based personal 
website builder (see Figure 2). On WIX, users can build their own websites with simple functions, making 
it a good choice to give participants a task and gather their opinions. After briefly introducing WIX, 
participants will be told that we are going to gather their opinions about the usage of WIX.com.  
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Figure 2. The Page of WIX  
 
The first experiment is a 3 between-subjects design (no monetary incentive, pre-paid and promised 
monetary incentives). This experiment can help us examine the effect of timing of monetary incentive. To 
involve participants in this website, we will ask them to finish a one-hour task about an online shop building. 
After the subjects finish the website usage and designs, the manipulations of payment timing of monetary 
incentives will be implemented during the time that participants are asked to give their comments about 
the usage of WIX. Participants in pre-paid monetary incentive groups will receive money first before they 
write comments about WIX; participants in promised monetary incentive groups will be told that they will 
receive money first after they write comments about WIX; participants in no monetary incentive groups 
will not be mentioned about monetary incentive. Before the participants leave the lab, they will be asked to 
fill in a questionnaire to gather their characteristics & background information, usage experience and 
reciprocity & autonomy feelings thinking about the reviews. 
A 2 * 4 (timing of payment * types of reminder contents) between-subjects design will be employed in the 
second experiment to test the hypotheses concerning the moderating role of reminder content. Eight groups 
are produced (as shown in Table 1). Similarly, the participants are asked to finish a one-hour task using 
WIX and then we implement the manipulations. Then we will ask whether the participants want to provide 
evaluations about WIX. Among those who agree to give comments, half will receive monetary incentives 
directly before they leave the lab and are asked to write comments for the following seven days (the pre-
payment condition). The other half will not receive the money immediately; instead, they are told to write 
reviews in seven days and then come to the lab for rewards (the promised-payment condition). Seven days 
are the opening durations of review channel since the experimental day. We add this limited time to mimic 
the situations in real life and increase the practical value of our results (i.e., Taobao). We will randomly 
allocate all subjects to the two conditions before the lab begins such that participants in each lab session 
will belong to the same manipulation condition to minimize the chance that subjects know the difference 
in the payment timing. They will also be required to watch for the emails in which we will send them the 
link to the review website. Before the subjects leave the lab, they will be asked to fill in a questionnaire.  
One day after the lab session, subjects will receive an email containing the link to WIX and the review 
website. We provide the link to the review website one day after the lab session in order to minimize 
participants’ instant and impulsive reviews. We also add a note stating that there is no hurry to write the 
reviews as we expect their reviews to be written based on their experience of refining the online shop within 
7 days. In this way we minimize the chance of reviews written before the sending of reminder emails. In 
addition, we will set a read receipt in the email to rule out participants who don’t open the email. 
Three days after the lab session, we send reminder emails with different contents to participants. In these 
emails, links to WIX and review page will also be offered with read receipts. To manipulate the contents in 
reminder messages, we randomly assign the participants from each payment timing condition into four 
experimental groups. One group will receive a reminder email that only emphasizing the importance of the 
review to the platform (the reciprocity condition), one group with a reminder email emphasizing the 
deadline and the remaining days left for providing the review (the autonomy condition), one group with a 
reminder email presenting both the deadline information and the importance of the review (the reciprocity 
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condition combined with the autonomy condition), and one group with no specific reminder content (the 
control condition). 
One week after the lab session, the review website will be closed and we will send the participants emails 
again with another questionnaire which contains similar questions measuring the sense of reciprocity & 
autonomy by asking subjects to recall the whole process of the experiment and review written. The 
participants belonging to the promised incentive group will be reminded about the time of money collection. 
The experimental design for the second experiment is presented in Table 1. The main dependent variable 
in our study is review quality and we intend to obtain data on review quality from two perspectives, namely 
review objectivity and review integrity since prior studies have already noticed the importance of these two 
aspects in online review content (Felbermayr and Nanopoulos 2016; Otterbacher 2009). Specifically, we 
intend to measure review objectivity using two methods. One is gathering participants from MTurk to 
evaluate review objectivity (or subjectivity) by designing different items. Another one is to employ text-
mining technics to conduct review subjectivity analysis following prior study’s process (Ghose and Ipeirotis 
2010). Similarly, we also measure review integrity by recruiting workers from MTurk and using text-mining 
methods in which the amount of optional review content is a measure standard of review integrity 
(O'Mahony and Smyth 2009). 
Table 1. Different Groups in the Second Experiment 
 Pre-paid monetary incentive Promised monetary incentive 
Reminder with review importance Group 1 Group 2 
Reminder with review deadline Group 3 Group 4 
Reminder with both information Group 5 Group 6 
Reminder with no such information Group 7 Group 8 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
Research Process 
We have finished the experimental design and will conduct lab experiment soon. Then we will use 
moderated mediation analysis in Stata Software to analyze the experiment data and test the hypotheses. If 
the results are as expected, we will explore the opportunity to collaborate with an online shop in HK to 
conduct a field experiment in which we will further manipulate the designation of a particular channel of 
online reviews—e.g., the seller’s website, the seller’s social media page, and the subjects’ own social media 
page—to enrich the research model and the theoretical/managerial implications.  
Discussions 
This study contributes to the existing literatures in several ways. First, we enrich the examination of the 
payment timing of monetary incentives. Previous studies have only considered the influence of promised 
monetary incentive (Dubé et al. 2017; Gutt et al. 2017), while our research fills the gap by introducing a new 
research direction to alleviate the crowding-out effect of monetary incentives. The second contribution is 
that we incorporate both autonomy and reciprocity as the two key mechanisms underlying the impact of 
payment timing on knowledge contribution (Deci and Ryan 1985; Gouldner 1960). Although previous 
literature have studied the reciprocity mechanism in the context of online survey response (Becker and 
Mehlkop 2011; Jobber et al. 2004), little research considers the effect of autonomy. Third, this study 
enhances the understanding of reminder messages used to encourage volunteer contribution. To our 
knowledge, no existing research concentrates on contribution quality and the specific contents in reminder 
emails.  
By examining different influences of payment timing (pre-paid and promised monetary incentive) in a lab 
experiment, this study offers a new direction for e-commerce platforms that adjusting the payment timing 
of rewards can increase the effectiveness of monetary mechanisms and attract more customer reviews, 
especially reviews with higher quality. We also remind practitioners to be careful when using reminder 
messages to motivate more participations in E-WoM. Although Amazon have already sent reminder email 
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to customers and found it an effective strategy to induce more online reviews, detailed guidances about the 
designs of reminder contents are still lacking. Therefore, our examination of the effects of reminder 
contents enables practitioners to design a more useful reminder mechanism. 
Several limitations should be mentioned. The first limitation is the fact that we could not guarantee the 
follow-up participations, which may induce fewer results and waste original sources. In the second 
experiment, the reviews are gathered by emails after lab section. This mode of data collection has larger 
chance losing contacts with participants compare to traditional modes proceeded in lab. Although we try to 
motive participations using reminder emails, this problem cannot be fully solved. The second limitation is 
the generalization problem. We use WIX (an experience good) as a product for participants to experience. 
This limits the application of our results to other types of products such as tablet computer belonging to 
search products. Last limitation is that pre-paid monetary incentives are costly and may not work in real 
life. Thus, we intend to add a field experiment to alleviate this limitation.  
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